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Soft Commodity Funds, Food Price Volatility, Speculation and Public 
Perception - Why soft commodities are a special asset class 
 





This paper reviews evidence on food price volatility, soft commodity speculation and the 
public perception of these practices, at least from a Belgian perspective.  Soft commodity 
speculation expanded greatly during the 2007-2008 food crisis and since then has become an 
asset class of its own in which many banks and investment institutions engage in.  This is 
fueled by food price volatility, especially for the soft primary commodities which the food 
industry uses as ingredients: cereals, oilseeds, vegetable oil, sugar, coffee, cocoa, etc. 
 
Of course, speculation is not new and extends to all primary commodities, to stocks and 
bonds,  currencies,  and  in  fact  all  asset  classes.    What  is  special  about  soft  commodity 
(comprising  all  agricultural  products  and  raw  materials  for  the  food,  fiber  and  bio-fuel 
industry) speculation is that it impacts on our daily food, and that there are nearly one billion 
people in the world that are chronically food insecure, i.e. don't have enough to eat every day 
for a normal and healthy life.  The recent food crisis added more than 100 million people, 
according  to  FAO,  to  that  group.    The  50 poorest  countries  in  the  world  -  basically  all 
agriculturally based economies - are nearly all net importers of food, particularly cereals, and 
thus depend on the world market for their food supply.  Many poor families spend over half 
their income on food.  And this is why food price speculation raises many ethical questions 
and  why  soft  commodities  -  the  basis  of  food  -  are  a  special  asset  class.    This  will  be 
examined in detail hereafter. 
 
2.  The 2007-2008 food crisis 
 
The 2007-2008 food crisis was a complex event.  It is the longest and largest food price 
bubble since 1900, although prices increased less than during the 1974 boom with the first oil 
crisis caused by OPEC.  Unlike previous commodity price booms, prices increased across the 
board and agricultural prices followed the price boom.  A combination of both supply and 
demand factors contributed to the price boom.  Input prices, particularly energy and fertilizer 
price increases outpaced agricultural price increases, with at the peak oil prices close to 150 $ 
per barrel.  Like in 1974, the oil crisis played a major role showing again the close link 
between agricultural prices and oil prices.  In food grains, there was no "strong" demand pull 
but  rather weak supply  because of weather factors.   For rice, many major exporters  (all,  
starting with India, except Thailand and the USA) put on export controls and even export 
bans.  This caused rice prices to triple in 2007-2008.  In biofuels and vegetable oils, strong 
demand  played  a  major  role  as  biofuels  could  easily  compete  with  fossil  fuels.    In  the 
livestock  sector,  increasing  feed  prices  led  to  large  price  increases.    Also,  food  prices 
increased more than the contribution of agricultural prices implied, induced by higher energy 
prices.   
 
                                                 
1  Food prices and agricultural prices are used interchangeably, although they pertain to different commodities.  
The term soft commodities is used for agricultural as well as food products.   2 
At the second half of 2008 with the banking and real estate crisis in the USA, which spread 
worldwide, a deep economic crisis set in.  Demand for high value added processed foods in 
emerging Asian countries collapsed (dairy, meat) and food prices went back to their pre- 
2007/2008 level, except in many poor developing countries depending on import.  Rice prices 
never went back to their previous level and remained high.  Weather induced agricultural 
supply shocks (e.g. wheat in 2010) became more frequent (El Nino, La Ninja in 2010) and 










As oil prices are again close to 100 US$/barrel and will probably continue to rise, a new 
coming surge in food prices is again predicted, e.g. by Nomura
2.  Nomura predicts "another 
multi-year  surge  in  food  prices  likely  given  rapidly  growing  demand  for  food  in  the 
developing world, constraints and uncertainties surrounding food supply and the development 
of  increasingly  powerful  feedback  loops".    They  have  constructed  a  Nomura  Food 
Vulnerability Index for 80 countries.   
 
All this is to be viewed against  the "big picture" which indicates a needed increase between 
70%  (most  optimistic  scenario)  and  100%  (pessimistic  scenario)  of  global  agricultural 
production in 2050 when the world population will have increased from 6,9  billion people 
now to 9 billion in 2050, 95% of the increase occurring in developing countries.  Even today 
at the beginning of 2011, several agricultural prices ar e already at a historic high: sugar, 
coffee, cocoa, palm oil, cotton, …The main conclusion from the foregoing is that agricultural 
prices  are  likely  to  remain  highly  volatile,  which  offers  interesting  opportunities  for 
speculation and investment as an asset class. 
 
3.  Increased volatility in agricultural and food prices? 
 
Volatility occurs when there are demand and/or supply shocks in conjunction with inelastic 
supply and demand. Inelasticity implies small shocks can have large price impacts.  Over the 
last decade, agricultural - and food prices have become more volatile.  At least, that is the 
perception.  Several reasons can be advanced: agricultural policy reform in OCDE countries 
with direct, decoupled income support replacing direct market interventions (price supports), 
thus allowing rapid supply/demand adjustments.  The economic liberalization in agriculture 
                                                 
2  Nomura, Global Economics and Strategy, "The coming surge in food prices", September 8, 2010.   4 
thus means that world market prices now penetrate more easily in domestic markets.  Slowing 
productivity growth in agriculture in industrialized countries, where agricultural prices in real 









surpluses.    Weather-related  impacts  which  are  unpredictable  have  certainly  gained  in 
importance, from dry spells in Australia and Russia to floods in Pakistan and frosts in Brazil.    5 
Such weather factors are expected to increase in importance.  Another factor is that publicly 
held stocks of agricultural products in OECD countries have nearly disappeared and, e.g. in 
2008, public cereal stocks were at their lowest level in 30 years, and are still low (less than 3-
months consumption) by any standard.  The significant policy of de-stocking in China may 
have contributed to price volatility, although China and India still keep the largest rice and 
wheat stocks in the world.  But they use these stocks only for smoothing domestic price 
movements and food security maintenance, not for controlling or influencing exports/imports 
when world market prices swing. 
 
Also, most poor developing countries that previously operated cereal marketing boards to 
control prices have either abolished them or reduced their role, liberalizing their domestic 
markets for private sector operators and imports.  One would expect that larger international 
agricultural trade will help to reduce price volatility but this has not been the case, for the 
reasons  given  above.    Particularly  reduced  international  stockholding,  weather  factors, 
currency fluctuations (EUR/US$) and the instauration of export controls have contributed to 
increased international price volatility.  Limiting water availability for irrigation is becoming 
an  important  supply  constraining  factor  in  irrigated  agriculture  in  Asia.    Thus  major 
uncertainties remain, including the oil price which now has a direct link with agriculture via 
biofuels  and  input  prices.    The  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute  (IFPRI)  has 
advocated public stock-holding as "virtual stocks" using market derivatives (hedging, option 
strategies) to help stabilize world agricultural prices.  But it is not clear who would be in 
charge of such a facility (the U.N.?), who would pay, modalities of operation, etc.  Most 
specialists consider such a scheme as too risky and too costly. 
 
It is interesting to note that Prof. Jo Swinnen
3 of K.U.Leuven has analyzed key agricultural 
policy measures of leading resear ch and policy organizations (World Bank, OECD, IMF, 
FAO, IFPRI).  He shows that during periods of low global food prices, they focus on the poor 
farmers being exploited by middlemen and government, while during periods of high global 
food prices, the focus shifts to the poor urban consumers that have become food insecure and 
hungry.  This inconsistency is related to organizational self -serving motivations.  The same 
has happened with the recent "land grabbing" issue, when after years of  NGOs complaining 
about low private sector investments in agriculture in poor countries, the focus shifted to poor 
farmers loosing their land while downplaying the new investment in agriculture that was 
occurring. 
 
Naylor and Falcon (2010) studied in detail cer eal price volatility since 1970.  They also 
studied recent price volatility of the major cereals and found that price volatility as measured 
by coefficients of variation were approximately the same in the post-2000 period as during the 
very volatile 1970s (table 1).  Severe price spikes occur about every 30 years. 
 
When the trend effect is eliminated, i.e. price variation around the trend (see table  2 below), 
they find that price volatility for all commodities during the post-2000 period was below that 
                                                 
3  Abstract: Only a few years ago the widely shared view was that low food prices were a curse to developing 
countries and the poor.  The dramatic increase of food prices in 2006-2008 appears to have fundamentally 
altered this view.  The vast majority of analyses and reports in 2008 and 2009 state that high food prices have 
a devastating effect on developing countries and the world's poor.  This reversal of opinion raises questions 
about the old and the new arguments and about the proposed remedies.  It also raises questions about the 
causes of this dramatic turnaround in analysis and policy conclusions.  The paper documents these changes in 
perspective and potential implications are discussed and hypotheses are offered on the cause of the change in 
views. http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos//DP/DP2010/DP259.pdf   6 
of the 1970s.  Rice again shows the highest price volatility.  And for rice, there is no well 
functioning futures market like for wheat and maize (see further). 
Table 1: Monthly variations, by decade, for selected real commodity prices 
  Coefficient of variation, in percent
a         
  1970-79  1980-89  1990-99  2000-09   
Wheat  36  24  21  32 
Maize  25  27  20  29 
Rice  44  43  14  49 
Petroleum  69  41  25  46   
a:  Standard deviation of each price series by decade, divided by its mean. 
Source:  IMF International Financial Statistics "http://www.imfstatistics.org" 
 
Table 2: Monthly variations, from trends, by decade, for selected real commodity prices 
  Root mean square error, in percent
a         
  1970-79  1980-89  1990-99  2000-09   
Wheat  13.7  6.6  8.4  7.6 
Maize  10.3  8.2  7.6  7.3 
Rice  15.5  10.7  6.3  9.0 
Petroleum  14.2  7.6  8.8  10.6   
a:  Standard error of the estimate, calculated from deviations about the equation: Log Real 
Price = a + b Time. 
Source:  IMF International Financial Statistics "http://www.imfstatistics.org" 
 
4.  An overview of the literature on speculation and its effects 
 
4.1.  An analysis of all the past issues of the "Journal of Futures Markets" (Wiley Periodicals) 
finds articles that support the thesis that futures market trading (including "speculation") 
may increase price volatility but does not fundamentally alter the basic underlying price 
trend.    At  least  one  article  rejects  that  categorically.    The  article  by  Henry Bryant, 
David Bessler and Michael Haighs on "Causality in futures markets", Journal of Futures 
Markets, Vol. 26, Issue 11, pp. 1039-1057, 2006, concludes that …"theories predicting 
that  the  activity  levels  of  speculators  or  uninformed  traders  affect  levels  of  price 
volatility, either positively or negatively, are rejected". 
 
  Volatility means in both directions: price increases and decreases.  The traditional view 
taken by economists following Milton Friedman's work is that informed futures market 
speculation will stabilize prices, since otherwise it would not be profitable.  However, 
the empirical evidence does not give strong support to this view.  In fact, much amateur 
speculation is unprofitable and there are numerous occasions in which futures prices 
appear to have been at odds with market fundamentals.  In the long term, there is always 
a fall back to market fundamentals of supply and demand, but in the short term price 
aberrations or irregularities do occur. 
 
4.2.  In the written testimony of Jeffrey Harris, chief economist of the Commodities Futures 
Trading  Commission  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Homeland  Security  and 
Government Affaires on May 20, 2008, he stated as follows (conclusion):   7 
  "All  the  data  modeling  and  analysis  we  have  done  to  date  indicates  there  is  little 
economic  evidence  to  demonstrate  that  prices  are  being  systematically  driven  by 
speculators in these markets.  Generally, the data shows that: 
  Prices have risen sharply for many commodities that have neither developed futures 
markets  (e.g.  durum  wheat,  steel,  iron  ore,  coal,  etc.)  nor  institutional  fund 
investments (Minneapolis wheat and Chicago rice). 
  Markets where index trading is greatest as a percentage of total open interest (live 
cattle and hog futures) have actually suffered from falling prices during the past 
year. 
  The level of speculation in the agriculture commodity and the crude oil markets has 
remained relatively constant in percentage terms as prices have risen. 
  Our studies in agriculture and crude oil markets have found that speculators tend to 
follow trends in prices rather than set them. 
  Speculators  such  as  managed  money  traders  are  both  buyers  and  sellers  in  these 
markets.  For example, data shows that there are almost as many bearish funds as 
bullish funds in wheat and crude oil"… 
  "Simply put the economic data shows that overall commodity price levels, including 
agriculture  commodity  and  energy  futures  prices  are  being  driven  by  powerful 
fundamental economic forces and the laws of supply and demand.  These fundamental 
economic factors include increased demand from emerging markets, decreased supply 
due  to  weather  or  geopolitical  events,  and  a  weakened  dollar.    Together,  these 
fundamental economic factors have formed a "perfect storm" that is causing significant 
upward pressure on futures prices across-the-board". 
 
4.3.  Dwight Sanders,  Scott Irwin  and  Robert Merrin  in  their  article:  "The  Adequacy  of 
Speculation in Agricultural Futures Markets: Too Much of a Good Thing?" published in 
the journal "Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy", Vol. 32, Issue 1, pp. 74-94, 
find the following regarding index funds in speculation: 
  "Regarding the relative size of the index funds, they usually comprise 10% to 20% of the 
total open positions within most markets.  However, because the indexes are almost 
exclusively long, they tend to make up 20% to 40% of the long-side of the market… 
  First,  agricultural  commodity  futures  markets  have  experienced  a  rapid  increase  in 
open interest that started in late 2004 and continues into 2008 for many markets.  For 
most markets, the index funds' percentage of open interest peaked in 2006 and has since 
stabilized.  Second, traditional speculative measures do not show any material changes 
or shifts over the sample period.  In most markets, the increase in long speculative 
positions was equaled or surpassed by an increase in short hedging.  Thus, even after 
adjusting speculative indices for index fund positions, values are within the historical 
ranges reported in prior research. While the analysis in this report does not test directly 
for price impacts, it does provide some pertinent evidence in this regard.  Index funds 
improve the adequacy of speculation by helping the market to "carry" unbalanced short 
hedging.  The relatively normal level of speculation over the sample period raises some 
doubt as to whether index funds are behind recent commodity price increases… 
  Proposals are once again surfacing to curb "harmful" speculation in futures markets.  
Such policy decisions aimed at curbing speculation may well be counterproductive in 
terms of price levels or market volatility.  In particular, these policy initiatives could 
severely  compromise  the  ability  of  futures  markets  to  accommodate  hedgers  and 
facilitate the transfer of risk".   8 
 
4.4.  An important OECD study by Scott Irvin and Dwight Sanders (June 2010) found that: 
  "While  the  increased  participation  of  index  fund  investments  in  commodity  markets 
represents  a  significant  structural  change,  this  has  not  generated  increased  price 
volatility, implies or realized, in agricultural futures markets.  Based on new data and 
empirical analysis, the study finds that index funds did not cause a bubble in commodity 
futures prices.  There is no statistically significant relationship indicating that changes 
in  index  and  swap  fund  positions  have  increased  market  volatility.    The  evidence 
presented here is strongest for the agricultural futures markets because the data on 
index trader positions are measured with reasonable accuracy.  The evidence is not as 
strong in the two energy markets studied here because of considerable uncertainty about 
the degree to which the available data actually reflect index trader positions in these 
markets. 
 
  An  unexpected  finding  was  a  negative  relationship  between  index  and  swap  fund 
positions and market volatility.  That is, there is some evidence that increases in index 
trader positions are followed by lower market volatility.  This result must be interpreted 
with considerable caution. The possibility still exists that trader positions are correlated 
with  some  third  variable  that  is  actually  causing  market  volatility  to  decline. 
Nonetheless,  this  finding is  contrary to  popular notions  about  the market  impact  of 
index funds, but is not so surprising in light of the traditional problem in commodity 
futures markets of the lack of sufficient liquidity to meet hedging needs and to transfer 
risk". 
 
4.5.  A June 2010 FAO Policy Brief (Nr. 9) on “Price surges in food markets” states that: 
  "The drastic increase of food prices in the period 2006-2008 spurred fears of global 
food insecurity.  Apart from actual changes in supply and demand of some commodities, 
the upward swing might also have been amplified by speculation in organized futures 
markets.  However, limiting or banning speculative trading might do more harm than 
good". 
 
  The policy brief, because of its importance, is in annex 2.  They conclude that for each 
study that finds a positive impact of speculation, there is at least one that claims the 
contrary.  Thus, there are a number of reasons to believe that speculation might not have 
been the main driver of the food price surge.  For steel and rice for which there are no 
major future markets, price volatility has also been high. 
 
4.6.  An  UNCTAD 2008  report  entitled:  "Addressing  the  Global  Food  Crisis:  Key  trade, 
investment and commodity policies in ensuring sustainable food security and alleviating 
poverty" said this about speculation in the food commodity market (p. 5): 
  "While there is no precise information on or analysis of the impact of speculative funds 
on  food  prices,  the  price  rises  in  respect  of  some  key  staples  are  attributable  to  a 
substantial  extent  to  speculation  by  different  actors  in  the  food  commodity  markets 
feeding the price rise spiral". 
 
  It is surprising that they make such an affirmative statement when they recognize that 
there is no precise information or analysis of the impact.  They logically should then not 
make such a statement. If a student would make such kind of reasoning, he/she would 
not pas the exam.   9 
 
4.7.  John Baffes and Tassos Haniotis at The World Bank - Development Prospects Group - 
wrote  in  July 2010  a  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Nr. 5371  that  came  to  the 
following conclusion: 
  "Any commodity-related activity on the financial side is unlikely to alter long-term price 
trends, which will ultimately be determined by market fundamentals.  But, such activities 
can  induce  higher  price  variability  in  the  sense  of  exacerbating  the  length  and  the 
amplitude of price cycles, as they most likely did during the 'perfect storm' of 2007/08". 
 
  This seems to be the consensus that is emerging among economists. 
 
4.8.  Finally, and in my view the most important, Rosamond Nayler and Walter Falcon of 
Stanford University published an interesting article entitled: "Food security in an Era of 
Economic  Volatility"  in  the  December 2010  issue  (pp.  693-723)  of  Population  and 
Development Review.  Here are the most important excerpts:  
  "Numerous allegations have been made about excessive speculation and the role that 
commodity index trading played in increasing food prices during 2008 (Sanders et al., 
2008; IFPRI, 2008).  There is no doubt that trading activity (open interest) soared after 
2003.  The number of contracts being traded in Chicago corn futures markets was about 
three times greater in 2007 and 2008 than in 2003; the number of wheat contracts was 
about  two  times  greater.    However,  whether  this  increased  activity  affected  price 
variations and/or price trends seems doubtful.  If changes in volume per se were the 
issue, the data indicate that the price spike should have occurred two to three years 
before it actually did. 
 
  A substantial amount of increased futures-market activity was the result of increased 
hedging.  Between January 2006 and January 2008, commercial use of corn futures in 
Chicago increased by a factor of about 2.0 and wheat by a factor of 1.5.  In contrast, the 
contracts held by index traders increased by a factor of only 1.4 in the case of corn and 
1.1 in the case of wheat (Aulerich et al., 2009).  During the spike period of August 2006 
to August 2008, the net positions of commodity index traders, measured in numbers of 
futures contracts, were essentially constant for the corn and wheat markets in Chicago.  
Based on these data, there does not seem to be a prima facie case that the behavior of 
commodity index traders was a principal cause of the sharp upward price movements 
for maize and wheat. 
 
  Second, the level of grain stocks, at first glance, appears to have been very low during 
the price run-up period.  Once Chinese stocks are removed from the calculation, there 
are no sharp dips in stocks for any of the grains; therefore, there is little empirical basis 
for claiming stock-to-use ratios as the driving force of the price spike.  Closer inspection 
of the stock data reveals a murky picture. 
 
  The third piece of the puzzle is whether the maize and wheat markets were working 
efficiently.  If futures and cash prices consistently came close to converging at the end of 
contract periods, the case for excessive speculation would be virtually impossible to 
defend.  Most of the time this equilibration occurred, but not always; several grain 
markets  showed  significant  cash-futures  divergence  during  various  contract  closing 
periods in 2008.  Much of the convergence problem between cash and futures contracts 
appears directly linked to specific delivery destinations".   10 
 
  Thus, their main conclusion is that speculation had little effect on the fundamentals.  
Our own conclusion after a literature review of these 8 studies is that speculation may 
increase price volatility, but it is difficult to prove it and in any case, if there is an effect, 
it will be short term.   In the medium  to  long term,  market  fundamentals  determine 
prices. 
 
5.  Speculation in soft commodities 
 
What  will  be  examined  here  is  futures  market  speculation  and  linked  to  it,  commodity 
investments.  Of particular concerns are soft commodities.  Commodity futures and options on 
futures markets allow to fix prices and therefore lock in profits at the times they make the 
decision, which is prior to the times they execute a physical sale or purchase.  Farmers (in the 
U.S.A.  in  particular)  or  producer  cooperatives  might  sell  forward  at  the  time  of  planting 
enabling  them  the  security  to  purchase  inputs  and  guaranteeing  them  to  make  a  profit.  
Exporters (e.g. of coffee or cocoa) can sell forward as soon as they purchase up - country 
giving them time to negotiate a physical sale while locking in profits.  Food processors can 
sell forward when they buy agricultural products, enabling them to make fixed price contracts 
with retailers, closing out when they sell the food products.  In all these cases, the futures 
transactions are paper transactions which are offset by the opposite transactions prior to the 
executions of the physical contract.  Operations in futures markets together with physical 
transactions are called hedging, which reduces price risk.  It is a means of coping with price 
volatility, but it does not reduce price volatility.  Hedgers require "speculators" as otherwise 
they would not always find a counterpart.  Thus, speculative activity - non-commercial people 
that  play  the  futures  market  with  pure  paper  transactions  intended  to  make  a  profit  -  is 
necessary for sufficient liquidity.  Over time, price bubbles or spikes have occurred - either 
positive or negative - but they are usually short lived.  There is no evidence that the level of 
speculation  has  increased  faster  than  that  of  hedging  and  thus  no  reason  to  believe  that 
bubbles have become more important over recent years than previously.  But there is much 
amateur speculation and most of it is unprofitable over time. 
 
But there is now a concern that investor diversification in the soft commodities asset class has 
led to large inflows of money which push prices up through the "weight of money".  Index 
based commodity investments add an index of commodities to a portfolio of equities and 
bonds as an asset class to increase expected returns consistent with a given level of risk.  They 
normally aim to replicate the returns on one of the two major investible commodity indices - 
the S&P GSCI
4, and the Dow Jones AIG index.  These investments are typically structured as 
commodity swaps and are arranged on an over the counter (OTC) basis by an investment 
bank.  The bank, which through the swap, arrives in a short position, buys futures contracts to 
offset this position.  Swaps are portfolios of OTC futures.  In a commodity swap, the  long 
party receives payments in proportion to the gains on a portfolio of (typically long) futures 
contracts and pays either a fixed or floating interest rate.  The principles remain the same.  
OTC contracts have the advantage that they can be designed to  suit client requirements, but 
the disadvantage that they can only be closed out through the original counterparty.  In a 
swap, the counterparty (usually a bank) will typically offset the net position in its swap book 
on exchange markets, and the swap will  be marked to market against the exchange forward 
                                                 
4  Goldman Sachs Commodity Index   11 
curve.  In that sense, OTC and swap markets are parasitic on futures markets, but it is better to 
see  them  as  using  the  futures  market  to  offer  a  more  extended  set  of  products.    Index 
investment required purchasing a portfolio of long-dated futures and rolling these forward as 
maturity approaches.  The overall return will be heavily influenced by the roll return, positive 
if there is backwardation (future price less than spot price) but negative in a contango (future 
price higher than spot price).  In any case, financial futures are many times more important 
than commodity futures, although commodity futures have been gaining importance. 
 
In aggregate, these investments can be large in relation to the market - often between 30% and 
40%  of  open  interest  (regular  commercial  hedging).    It  is  thus  possible  that  they  are 
sufficiently  large  to  move  prices  -  the  "elephant  in  the  room"  argument.    Index-based 
investments  are  allocated  across  commodities  in  proportions  dictated  by  the  index 
composition.    In  the  S&P  GSCI  index,  grains  and  vegetable  oils  (9.9%),  other  soft 
commodities  (2.6%)  and  livestock  (3.5%)  together  make  up  16%,  while  energy  alone 
constitutes 75.6%.  In the Dow Jones AIG index, the energy weight is limited to one-third.  
Thus,  such  investments  generate  upward  pressure  across  the  entire  range  of  primary 
commodities.  This happened in 2007-2008.  The evidence suggests that the large inflows of 
commodity  investment  funds  did  push  up  agricultural  futures  prices  to  mid-2008  and  in 
reverse down in late 2008, thus adding to price volatility, including of soft commodities
5.  The 
large price falls of all commodities in late 2008 led to large losses of commodity investors.  
Thus, diversification in commodities was then very unprofitable.  In 2010, such investments 
became again quite profitable.  The investment levels in 2009 were back to end -2005 levels.  
The opinion of Prof. C. Gilbert, a commodity market specialist, is that we should not worry 
too much about fut ures market speculation  -  it is of minor importance  -  or commodity 
investments as they are likely to go away by itself when commodity prices fall.  But he does 
expect "frothiness" in agricultural prices, i.e. a series of small bubbles or spikes occurring i n 
the future. 
 
Speculators assume risks related to the price of a commodity and in this sense, take risk away 
from physical commodity holders.  By entering in a futures contract, both the seller and the 
buyer gain certainty of the price of their transaction, independent of the actual development of 
the market.  For speculators, futures allow much higher leverage than physical ownership, as 
physical ownership requires cash payment on delivery while futures usually only require to 
make a deposit of initial margin, typically 10% of the value of a position for a client of good 
standing.  This makes the futures market very interesting for speculators as you can speculate 
on the 100 US$ value of a commodity with only a 10 US$ down payment.  But many hedge 
funds lost huge sums of money when the commodities markets collapsed at the end of 2008.  
Many then expected a recession, not a depression, and further lost money. 
 
It is common for traders and investors operating in the futures market not to take physical 
delivery of commodities.  This happens only in 1 to 2% of cases.  Thus no raw materials are 
removed from the supply chain, one more reason why investors are unlikel y to affect spot 
prices.  They close their positions in the futures markets before or at the maturity date.  If they 
have bought, they sell or vice versa.  Yet, in August  2010, Armajaro, an important cocoa 
trader in London, took physical delivery of 800,00 0 t of cocoa, about one -third of yearly 
world  consumption,  probably  on  anticipation  of  violent  elections  in  November  2010  in 
Côte d'Ivoire, which normally supplies about 40% of the world market of cocoa. 
                                                 
5  Source: Christopher Gilbert, The Future of the Global Food System - How to Combat Volatility, Brussels, 
19 May 2009; seminar on the future of the global food system organized by Olivier De Schutter and 
Jo Swinnen.   12 
 
Commodities  as  an  asset  class  offer  many  advantages.    In  principle,  price  moves  are 
uncorrelated to share and bond prices.  They may act as a hedge against inflation and currency 
depreciation and finally they  are seen as  an investment  in  emerging markets,  particularly 
China which started buying commodities (raw materials) on a large scale since 2005.  It is 
thus no surprise that now commodities usually make up 5 to 10% of investment portfolios as a 
means  of  diversification.    The  reality  is  also  that  commodity  markets  have  always  been 
volatile.  Harvests always depend on weather and metals and oil production require long term 
investments such that short term demand fluctuations cause a lot of volatility in prices. 
 
It is important to note that there are a number of important commodities which are not traded, 
or not traded significantly, on future markets.  The prices of these commodities have not gone 
up less than other commodities - important examples are iron ore and steel, whose prices have 
raised enormously, diamonds and minor metals (rhodium, rhenium, tungsten, etc.).  On the 
agricultural front, futures trading is not important in rice (Chicago rice is illiquid and the main 
Bangkok market is not easily accessed by international traders).  These examples suggest that 
speculation and investment are not the main elements of the story. 
 
6.  Public perception of speculation on food prices 
 
The public perception of speculation on food prices is overwhelmingly negative.  First of all, 
"speculation" always has a negative connotation - it is seen as trying to make money without 
producing or contributing anything useful.  Speculation is also ill defined: when a farmer 
withholds his harvest for sale later in the year, is he speculating?  The term comprises so 
many meanings in popular belief that it becomes meaningless unless it is properly defined.  In 
this paper, we narrow it down to futures market speculation and linked to it, commodity 
investments (index or not) in the future. 
 
During  the  2007-2008  food  crisis,  speculation  was  seen  by  many  as  one  of  the  main 
contributing factors to increasing food prices.  Prof. Olivier De Schutter, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, said as follows at the High-Level Conference in World Food 
Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bio-energy, Rome, 3-5 June 2008: 
"Finally, one factor which needs to be addressed is the role of speculation on the markets of 
primary commodities, particularly food commodities, in the current increase in prices.  The 
impact  of  speculative  investment  in  agricultural  futures  markets  is  well  documented,  for 
instance  in  the  recent  OECD-FAO  Agricultural  Outlook  2008-2017,  presented  on 
29 May 2008.  It has been reported that total index-fund investment in corn, soybeans, wheat, 
cattle and hogs has increased in 2007 to more than 47 billion USD, from 10billion USD in 
2006.  This has contributed to push the international prices of such commodities upwards on 
specialized boards, such as the Chicago Board of Trade.  More attention should be paid by 
the international community to this phenomenon, for despite certain attempts, states acting 
unilaterally may find it difficult to effectively tackle this problem.  The large influx of funds 
from financial investors into agricultural futures and options markets has raised concerns 
that this may have driven up prices and contributed to the volatility of prices - a volatility 
which is in the interest neither of consumers, which pay higher prices as a result, nor of 
producers, for whom credit may become unaffordable as a result, nor of governments, whose 
social programmes may have to bridge the gap between the incomes of the poorest and their 
needs.  While market mechanisms may have a useful role to play, the harmful impact of   13 
speculation on food commodities must be addressed, and this should be a component of any 
plan of action adopted by the international community to tackle the current crisis". 
 
In his briefing note O2 of September 2010 on "Food Commodities Speculation and Food 
Price  Crises  -  Regulation  to  reduce  the  risks  of  price  volatility",  he  states  (from  the 
Summary): 
"In particular there is a reason to believe that a significant role was played by the entry into 
markets for derivatives based on food commodities of large, powerful institutional investors 
such  as  hedge  funds,  pension  funds  and  investment  banks,  all  of  which  are  generally 
unconcerned with agricultural market fundamentals.  Such entry was made possible because 
of deregulation in important commodity derivates markets beginning in 2000.  These factors 
have yet to be comprehensively addressed, and to that extent, are still capable of fuelling 
price rises beyond those levels which would be justified by movements in supply and demand 
fundamentals.    Therefore,  fundamental  reform  of  the  broader  global  financial  sector  is 
urgently required in order to avert another food price crisis.  Previously unregulated Over the 
Counter (OTC) derivatives must be subject to rules requiring registration and learning on 
public  exchanges,  and  exemptions  to  these  rules  must  be  highly  restricted.    As  regards 
commodity  derivatives  trading  in  particular,  States  should  ensure  that  dealing  with  food 
commodity  derivatives  is  restricted  as  far  as  possible  to  qualified  and  knowledgeable 
investors  who  deal  with  such  instruments  on  the  basis  of  expectations  regarding  market 
fundamentals, rather than mainly or only by speculative motives.  These measures would 
enable States to fulfill their legal obligations arising under the human right to food". 
 
The recommendations are comprehensive reform of all derivatives trading, restricted access to 
commodities futures markets, strengthening of spot markets and establishment of physical 
grain reserves. 
 
In  a  private  correspondence  with  Prof. Olivier De Schutter,  he  agrees  that  the  impact  of 
speculation is difficult to measure.  The mere fact that the volumes of investment into the 
primary commodity futures markets, particularly in the food sector, have been multiplied by 4 
or 5 between 2006 and 2007 does give in his view an indication of the importance of this 
factor and is for him decisive.   
 
Normally,  you  would  expect  that  farmers  and  farm  organizations  such  as  the  Belgian 
Boerenbond would welcome speculation as it leads to higher farm prices.  Presently, hog 
prices are very low and the only possible speculation is on the CBOT for lean pork and pork 
bellies, but that last commodity will be taken out of the futures market because of thin trading.  
Right  now,  more  speculation  on  hogs  would  be  a  very  positive  event,  or  not?    The 
Boerenbond president Piet Vanthemsche is  against  all food speculation  -  "we need stable 
prices and not speculators that on the back of poor consumers make money - it is unethical".  
A surprising position of defending consumers when you represent producers.  He states that 
speculators do not participate in the production process and thus are not entitled to make 
money on the sweat of farmers. 
 
When in 2008 KBC bank of Belgium promoted a life insurance product (type 23) from 4-
29 February, 2008 which invested in 6 agrarian commodities (cocoa, sugar, coffee, wheat, 
maize, soybeans), there was a public uproar - speculation on hunger and starvation - getting 
rich on the backs of hungry people.  The socialist political party PS drew up a law to forbid 
such type of investments.  This despite that such a financial product was capital protected and 
provided  a  compensation  for  the  buyer  against  food  price  increases.    Terms  like  casino-  14 
capitalism, cynical exploitation of the hungry people of this world were in the air.  Also in the 
European  Parliament,  the  PES-fraction  heavily  criticized  food  price  speculation.    Also 
Deutsche Bank and Robeco came under criticism.  At the same time, India halted temporarily 
futures market operations on food commodities.  In the Netherlands, especially ABN Amro is 
specialized in turbo's on cocoa, coffee, maize, sugar, soybeans and rice.  Most people believe 
that the sheer weight of money going into agricultural derivatives is pushing food prices, 
despite scant evidence corroborating.  Clearly, soft commodities are a special asset class, not 
to be treated like energy, minerals or oil. 
 
Harpers Magazine in the USA published in July 2010 a stinging report entitled: "The food 
bubbles: How Wall Street starved millions and got away with it". 
 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president will use France's presidency of the G8 and G20 to push 
for  rules  to  curb  food  price  volatility,  including  controls  on  soft  commodity  speculation.  
NGO activism against food price speculation is widespread and influential. 
 
In  "The  Broker",  Issue 23  of  December 2010/January 2011,  a  magazine  funded  by  the 
Netherlands  Organization  for  Scientific  Research  -  Science  for  Global  Development, 
Carlos Oya, a senior lecturer in political economy of development, University of London, 
writes under the title "Malfunctioning markets - local and global food distribution" that the 
global  food  system  is  a  sick  patient,  suffering  from  unequal  distribution  and  excessive 
liberalization.  Indeed, there is a striking parallel between the 2007-08 food crisis and the 
financial crisis.  Under the subtitle "Gamblers on the food market", he writes: 
"How has financialization affected international food markets?  The crisis saw a dramatic 
fluctuation - a massive increase followed by drastic decline  - in the prices of basic food 
commodities such as maize, rice, oilseeds and wheat.  The theory that financial speculation is 
one of the causes of the food crisis is gaining credibility, especially among more progressive 
critics.    Indeed,  the  global  food  crisis  and  the  global  financial  crisis  are  'intimately' 
connected, particularly through the impact of financial speculation on the world trade prices 
of food. 
 
This  financial  speculation  was  driven  by  powerful  institutional  investors  and  investment 
banks dealing in hedge funds, like Goldman Sachs.  They were a driving force in the run-up to 
the food crisis.  Significant deregulation of the financial system and commodity exchanges in 
the United States in the early 2000s paved the way for the integration of the financial and 
agricultural commodity markets.  Moreover, unregulated commodity trading rapidly led to a 
dramatic increase in financial transactions, which attracted a growing number of financial 
speculators.  They, in turn, sought to profit from short-term changes in prices.  Hedge funds 
became major players in the futures exchanges of oilseed and wheat, for example. 
 
On the eve of the crisis, futures prices of these commodities were driving up spot prices - the 
price quoted for immediate payment of a commodity - creating a spiral of price increases as 
long as speculators continued to gamble on higher prices.  Not surprisingly, this generated 
massive volatility.  In this context, the prospects for poor buyers of food may be even more 
grim now than before 2007, especially since staples are being targeted by traders who buy 
and sell 'risk' for profit. 
 
What can be done to rectify the situation?  For starters, international commodity markets for 
agricultural produce need to be isolated from the harmful influence of financial markets.    15 
Regulation of commodity exchanges needs to tighten.  Agreements need to be developed and 
signed by the international community designed to stabilize food prices…". 
 
This  piece  form  a  professor  of  political  economy  of  development  from  the  (respected) 
University of London shows how financial speculation is seen as linked to dysfunctioning 
markets,  poverty  and  hunger.    Such  an  article  would  never  be  written  in  such  terms  for 
speculation in oil, gas, metals or currencies.  It shows how deep seated the opposition is to 
financial  speculation  on  food,  and  how  poorly  the  functioning  of  the  futures  market  is 
understood.  If a (respected) academic publishes such vitriol against speculation, what should 
the man in the street think!!! 
 
7.  Pro and contra of financial products on soft commodities 
 
PRO 
-  diversification  instrument  for  investors  -  targeting  a  non  traditional  asset  class 
(commodities); 
-  very atypical market dynamics - no classical correlations with currency, equity or bond 
dynamics; 
-  hedging opportunity for commercial operators; 
-  hedging is an appropriate solution to higher price volatility - it allows to cope with risk; 
-  speculators or non commercial operators are necessary for sufficient liquidity in futures 
markets.    Speculators  accelerate  the  process  of  finding  an  equilibrium  price  and  thus 
contribute to stabilization of the physical market; 
-  most financial institutions now offer such products.  
 
CONTRA 
-  there  was  a  massive  inflow  of  money  via  index  investments  in  OTC  markets,  thus 
escaping  regulation  via  swaps  with  investment  banks.    It  is  not  really  clear  what  the 
"weight of money" does to price volatility in spot and futures markets; 
-  although only 1 to 2% of futures contracts actually end up in delivery of the physical 
commodity, there have been cases recently (Armajaro for cocoa) where massive physical 
delivery has occurred, thus cornering the physical market to some extent; 
-  speculation is usually poorly understood by the general public.  It is a very contentious 
issue.  "Stop food speculation" in Google: 3.180.000 hits on 04.01.2010 
-  open letter to Commissioner Barnier: stop food speculation, 29 March 2010; 
-  Food  First/Institute  for  Food  and  Development  Policy:  Today  a  coalition  of  faith, 
hunger,  international  development,  human  rights,  farm  and  food  organizations, 
including Food First, sent a letter to President Barack Obama requesting speedy U.S. 
government action to prevent speculation in agricultural futures markets that threatens 
the food security of hundreds of millions of people worldwide; 
-  Belgian  Boerenbond Chairman Vanthemsche has  taken  clear position against  food 
speculation and financial soft commodity investments; 
-  increasing NGO activism against. 
-  KBC bank faced a media storm in 2008 over a soft commodities tracker; 
-  money put into commodity derivatives by speculators is not investment in agriculture.  It 
does not affect production capacity.   16 
8.  Conclusions 
 
1.  The 2007-2008 food price spike was comparable in absolute terms to the one in the early 
1970's induced by the first OPEC crisis, but smaller as a deviation of the trend.  Such 
bubbles are now expected to occur more frequently, may be as frothiness - a series as 
small  bubbles  as  the  one  in  2010  -  because  of  macro-economic  instability,  weather 
changes, less public stockholding and other factors. 
 
2.  Speculation can possibly drive up futures prices, but only in the short term.  In the longer 
term, prices cannot depart from their fundamentals.  Either the speculators are right, and 
the market becomes tight with higher prices, or they are wrong, and prices fall back.  Such 
a fall back occurred in 2005-2006 with sugar.  Sugar rose on expectations that it would be 
massively converted into bio-ethanol.  But this happened only in Brazil where sugar is 
converted into ethanol since the 1970s. 
 
3.  There was a huge rise in non-traditional ways of investing in food commodities in 2005-
2008, that is investment as an asset class for portfolio diversification by participants who 
are not connected with the foods - 5 to 10% of commodities in a portfolio of otherwise 
stocks and bonds.  The value of global investment in commodities (all) index funds rose 
from an estimated US$ 15 billion in 2003 to US$ 200 billion in 2008 (U.S. Senate report).  
What the exact influence is of that "weight of money" is still subject to debate.  The 
evidence seems to point to increased short term price volatility (up or down) not affecting 
the  long  term  trend  which  is  determined  by  fundamental  physical  supply/demand 
fundamentals. 
 
4.  Efforts to reduce speculation in futures markets might even have unintended negative 
consequences by reducing liquidity in the markets.  Regulatory measures should aim to 
enhance confidence in the good functioning of the markets, increasing transparency and 
the amount of information on futures trading. 
 
5.  Soft commodities are not like any other asset class.  The direct link of food to poverty, 
hunger  and  starvation  in  this  globalized  word  raises  many  ethical  questions  about 
investments in soft commodity prices and their derivatives.  Moreover, financial markets 
in  general  and  the  futures  markets  with  its  needed  non-commercial  speculation,  are 
generally poorly understood by the public at large.  Trying to make money with risk 
management  instruments  not  directly  connected  with  producing  goods  does  not  enjoy 
support by the man in the street.  This is all the more the case with food because of its 
direct implications for many poor people in the world that spend 50% or more of their 
income on it. 
 
6.  A general commodity tracker product based on the S&P GSCI or Dow Jones AIG index 
will probably escape attention from the NGO community and public as being related to 
food prices.  But the listed categories of commodities should mention food.  It should be 
stressed that commodities are now an important asset class which are now part of any 
diversified investment portfolio. 
*** 
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●●Commodity futures have become an integral part of food markets 
●●For some, they are a tool to “hedge” against fluctuating prices; others use them as 
speculative investments 
●●Appropriate regulation can improve market performance 
Price surges in food markets 
How should organized futures markets be regulated? 
 
The drastic increase of food prices in the period 2006-2008 spurred fears of global food insecurity. Apart from 
actual changes in supply and demand of some commodities, the upward swing might also have been amplified 
by speculation in organized futures markets. However, limiting or banning speculative trading might do more 
harm than good. 
 
Food prices on the rise 
 
Food prices soared on world markets between 2006 and 2008 (see figure). Prices of maize, rice and wheat, for 
example, reached their highest levels in 30 years. The crisis caused political and economic instability and led to 
food riots in a number of countries. Although prices have declined notably, the market is still perceived as more 
volatile than before the crisis.  
 
High oil prices, strong demand for crops from the bio-fuel sector, falling stockpiles of food and lower cereal 
production all contributed to the price surge. The development was further boosted by strong economic growth 
and expansive monetary policies that resulted in low interest rates. Policies such as export restrictions that many 
countries implemented as a response to rising food prices also played a role. 
 
While macroeconomic factors in conjunction with changes in supply and demand certainly caused an upward 
pressure on food markets, they alone cannot satisfactorily explain the hike. Some therefore believe that the 
“commodities super cycle” was amplified by speculative behavior in organized futures markets. 
 
What are commodity futures? 
 
Futures contracts involve the formal obligation to sell or buy a given amount of a commodity at a specified time. 
They thus provide an important instrument to “hedge” against the price risks in commodity markets and are 
basically used by all traders of physical commodities as part of their normal trading behavior. By entering in a 
futures contract, both the seller and the purchaser gain certainty of the price of their transaction, independent of 
the actual development of the market. 
 
However, only 2 percent of futures contracts end in the delivery of the physical commodity. Instead, commodity 
futures are generally traded before their expiration date. As a result, futures also attract investors who are not 
interested in the commodity as such, but in making a speculative gain. In fact, commodity futures have become 
increasingly appealing to non-commercial investors as their returns seem to be negatively correlated with returns 
to equities and bonds. They thus constitute an attractive vehicle for portfolio diversification. This process has 
provided  important  liquidity  to  the  market  since  speculators  are  assuming  risks  related  to  the  price  of  the 
commodity. 
 
Speculation and food prices 
 
Does speculation in commodity futures increase price volatility on food markets? Some economists say no, 
suggesting instead that futures markets have a stabilizing effect as traders merely react to price signals that 
eventually depend on market fundamentals. In this way speculation would even accelerate the process of finding 
an equilibrium price.   22 
Such theory, however, may not hold in the presence of trend-following investors or those with market power. 
For example, in the short term an investor might be attracted by the opportunities offered by the upward trend of 
a commodity price although this development may not be based on any fundamental data. These speculative 
investments could strengthen the trend and push the futures price further from its true equilibrium, especially if 
many investors jump the bandwagon (“herd behavior”) or those who invest have sufficient funds to influence the 
market. 
 
Index funds are an example of such powerful investors. They have become key players in the market, holding 
about 25-35 percent of all agricultural futures contracts. Besides investing large amounts of money, they also 
hold futures contracts for a long time. Some observers suggest that this trading behavior makes them less likely 
to react to changes in market fundamentals. 
 
Empirical evidence for both hypotheses is inconclusive. For each study that finds a positive impact there is at 
least one that claims the contrary. Indeed, there are a number of reasons to believe that speculation might not 
have been the main driver of the food price surge. 
 
For one, price volatility has also been high for commodities that do not have future markets or for which these 
markets  are  not  important  (e.g.  steel  and  rice).  Furthermore,  as  excess  demand  in  well-functioning  futures 
markets can easily be met by sufficient supply (i.e. by issuing new futures contracts), the effect of speculation on 
the equilibrium price is relatively small and short-lived compared to price swings of a physical asset where 
supply might be less elastic or even fixed. 
 
What type of regulation? 
 
Available analyses and data suggest that trading in futures markets may have amplified price volatility in the 
short term only. Longer-term equilibrium prices, however, are ultimately determined in cash markets where 
buying and selling physical commodities reflects the fundamental supply and demand forces. 
 
Efforts to reduce speculation in futures  markets  might even have unintended consequences. Mechanisms to 
intervene  in  futures  markets,  if  the  futures  price  diverges  from  an  equilibrium  level  determined  by  market 
fundamentals (a level which in itself will be difficult to determine), might divert speculators from trading and 
thus lower the liquidity in the market available for hedging purposes. Proposals to create an international fund to 
react to price hikes in futures markets might therefore not be an optimal solution. What is more, such a fund 
would require exorbitant resources to counteract speculation effectively. 
 
Instead,  regulatory  measures  should  aim  primarily  at  enhancing  confidence  in  the  good  functioning  of  the 
market. This can be achieved by increasing transparency and the amount of available information on futures 
trading. Furthermore, suspicious behavior (e.g. traders requesting permission to invest above their speculative 
position limits) should be investigated closely, as already practiced by the US futures trading supervisory body. 
In August 2009, the agency lifted exemptions for two firms trading in maize, wheat and soybean futures. 
 
Commodity futures have become an integral part of food markets, and they perform an important role for many 
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